Mitchell, 1991). Far-ranging judgments are made about "psychopaths" o such as dangerousness, recidivism, and treatability (for an overview, se 1988; Reid, 1978) . What is alarming about these judgments is that the v both DSM III-R and commonly employed psychometric models of AP ously questioned (Rogers & Dion, 1991) .
Validation of Personality Disorders
Personality disorders, unlike schizophrenic and mood disorders, do well-established biological markers and do not evidence predictable resp treatment challenges. Invoking the classic Syndenham criteria (i.e., exclusion, and outcome criteria; see Murphy, Woodruff, Herjanic, & 1974) for an Axis II diagnosis is problematic. Since personality traits te overlapping and, by definition, life-long, exclusion and outcome criter ficult to achieve. Spitzer (1983) recommended the Longitudinal Expert Evaluation using the All Data (LEAD) model for validating diagnoses in the absence of criterionrelated validity. However, the LEAD model lacks specific guidelines for what constitutes an expert evaluation or how "all" data should be weighted and integrated. Skodol, Rosnick, Kellman, Oldman, and Hyler (1988) attempted to apply the LEAD model to 20 personality-disordered patients with SCID-generated DSM-III-R diagnoses. They found a moderate degree of convergence (70% hit rate; kappas were not reported) between the two methods. Livesley (1985a Livesley ( , 1985b Livesley ( , 1986 has championed the use of prototypical analysis as an alternative approach to the validation of personality disorders. Prototype theory, based largely on the work of Rosch (1973 Rosch ( , 1978 , seeks to construct categories (e.g., diagnoses) through ratings of most representative or central characteristics. Livesley and his colleagues (Livesley & Jackson, 1986; Livesley, Reiffer, Sheldon, & West, 1987) performed an extensive survey of 938 North American psychiatrists on the 11 DSM-III personality disorders. Psychiatrists were asked to make prototypicality ratings for a single personality disorder. Unfortunately, respondents for each disorder ranged from 38 to 49 and thus provided a very modest sampling of clinicians (i.e., fewer subjects than variables). Mean ratings for individual criteria were generally high (>5 on a 7-point scale) for each diagnosis, which tended to obscure differences in prototypicality. Current approaches to validation (i.e., LEAD and protypical) while presently favored, are by no means exhaustive. Other attempts to validate Axis II disorders include (a) the development of a circumplex model (Conte & Plutchik, 1981; Plutchik & Conte, 1988) , in which validity is based on similarity ratings of personality traits that are compared across each disorder, and (b) interpersonal models (e.g., Kiesler, 1985) , in which validity is derived from a translation of personality disorders into interpersonal schemata that are subsequently tested against a priori hypotheses. Still others (e.g., Frances, 1982 Frances, , 1985 argue for a dismantling of the current categorical system of diagnosis in favor of a dimensional model; validity of dimensional diagnoses would correspond closely to test validation of psychometric measures.
Current Status of APD Diagnosis
DSM III-R diagnostic criteria (American Psychiatric Association its recent predecessor DSM-III (American Psychiatric Association, 198 radical departure from the earlier characterological models of AP Psychiatric Association, 1968; Cleckley, 1976) . In contrast to the DSM sis on impaired socialization and impulse control, DSM-III focused on havioral disturbances with formal inclusion criteria for dyssocial an behavior. More recently, DSM-III-R has continued the descriptiv changed the developmental criteria to reflect violently antisocial act DSM-III and DSM-III-R instituted a primarily polythetic model th minimum criteria (i.e., any 3 of 12 developmental plus any 4 of 10 adu of which any combination would qualify for APD. The polythetic m two implicit assumptions: First, all criteria and subcriteria should be equal weight (e.g., truancy and firesetting are treated equally in mak nosis). Second, no distinction is made on the basis of frequency or se symptoms (e.g., no difference between one assault with a weapon such assaults). To treat any combination of APD criteria meeting or minimal DSM-III-R standards as comparable results in a bewildering discordant array of diagnostic possibilities. Rogers and Dion (1991) co possible variations of DSM-III-R APD disorder at 3.4 x 108 for the cr and 2.9 x 1010 when each subcriterion is also considered.
The diagnostic reliability of APD is probably constrained by the of its criteria and subcriteria.' Based on DSM-III field trials (Spitzer, Nee, 1979) , APD initially appeared to have adequate interrater reliabi of .87 and .68), although a subsequent study by Mellsop, Varghese, J Hicks (1982) proved far less successful (kappa = .49). Efforts to i diagnostic reliability of APD through the use of structured intervie duced mixed results. Reliabilities of APD diagnosis derived from the Interview Schedule (DIS, Robins, Helzer, Croughan, & Ratcliff, 1981) kappas of .63 (Robins et al., 1981) , .58 to .65 (Vandiver & Sher, 1991 , and .54 (Perry, Lavori, Cooper, Hoke, & O'Connell, 1 (Blouin, Perez, & Blouin, 1988) for a computerized version. Zimm Coryell (1989) (Spitzer, Williams, Gibbon, & First, 1989) . If w DSM III threshold of kappas >.70 as indicative of "good agreement Psychiatric Association, 1980, p. 468) , then only two of 10 studie criterion.2 As a further complication, each of the above studies examin III, not DSM III-R diagnosis; we simply have no reliability data on APD a to the DSM-III-R criteria.
Psychometric Approaches to APD Psychometric methods of assessing APD were developed independently o DSM nosology. Therefore, it is not surprising that fundamental differences in th conceptualization of APD are reflected in low correlations between test results and DSM-III. For example, Scale 4 of the MMPI was constructed on persons with extensive histories of minor delinquency (Greene, 1989) ; biserial correlations be tween Scale 4 and DSM-III average a mere .26 (Hare, 1985a) . Similarly, Millo (1981) proposed a biosocial learning theory as the basis for personality disorder and posited that antisocial personality (Scale 6A of the MCMI-II) was based o aggressive feelings, sensation seeking, vindictiveness, and perceived hostility in others. MCMI's divergence from DSM-III is readily apparent in the modest correlation between the two approaches (r = .28; Widiger & Sanderson, 1987) .
As alternative to traditional test methods was devised by Hare (1981 Hare ( , 1985b in the form of the Psychopathy Checklist (PCL). The PCL and a subsequen revision (PCL-R) have good psychometric properties (see Hare, 1985a; Harper Hakstian, & Hare, 1988; Schroeder, Schroeder, & Hare, 1983 ) that include interrater reliability (r = .89), internal consistency (a = .90), and correlation with a criterion-based measure (r = .80). In addition, scores on the PCL demonstrated expected differences in the management of correctional inmates (Hare & McPher son, 1984) and predictive validity for both recidivism (Hart, Kropp, & Hare, 1988 and treatment response (Ogloff, Wong, & Greenwood, 1990) . Most recently, the PCL-CV (Hare, Cox, & Hart, 1989 ) was developed and is expected to be a catalyst for further modifications of APD in DSM-IV .
Diagnostic Elusiveness of APD
The above review of APD could be expanded to include further diagnostic variations (e.g., Cleckley, 1976) A common thread among diverse if not competing APD models is partial agreement on a constellation of "antisocial" characteristics/behavior which violate "prosocial" normative standards. Who should judge the antisocial and prosocial dimensions? Mental health professionals have a substantial advantage over others in most matters of diagnosis, by virtue of their training and e This advantage may become a liability in case of a controversial diagno APD for two reasons: (a) clinicians may become theory-bound with slav herence to a particular model; and (b) APD, perhaps more than any oth der, is an explicit deviation from social norms. Such delineation of soci does not fall within clinical expertise but reflects a broader and more en ing view of antisocial and prosocial behavior.
An interesting alternative is to survey nonprofessionals regarding dimensions inherent in APD. In this respect, Horowitz and his co (Horowitz, Post, French, Wallis, & Siegelman, 1981; Horowitz, Wright, stein, & Parad, 1981; Horowitz, French, & Anderson, 1982) have dem the usefulness of nonprofessionals in the prototypical analysis of psyc agnoses. They found, for example, that ratings by nonprofessionals ass simplifying and clarifying the diagnosis of depression. Given the diagn siveness of APD, we decided to conduct a prototypical analysis on a sub sample of nonprofessionals for DSM variations and PCL.
METHOD Subjects
A sample of 250 adult volunteers was solicited through the research program at the Ontario Science Centre. The sample comprised 120 males and 126 females with missing data for gender on 4 subjects. National origin was relatively balanced between Canadian (109 or 43.6%) and American (99 or 39.6%), with comparatively small numbers from the United Kingdom (19 or 7.6%) and other countries (19 or 7.6%), or with missing data (4 or 1.6%). The group was generally well educated (M = 15.64 years, SD = 3.00) and covered much of the adult lifespan (M = 33.23, SD = 11.39).
Procedure
Criteria for the DSM classifications were placed on a master list. Since DSM II provides a description without formal criteria, we operationalized DSM-II as seven descriptors: (a) incapable of significant loyalty to individuals, groups, or social values, (b) selfish, (c) failure to accept responsibility, (d) poorjudgment and failure to learn from experience, (e) boredom/low frustration level, (f) lack of remorse, and (g) blames others or offers plausible rationalizations for their behavior. All DSM-III (12 childhood and 9 adult) and DSM-III-R (12 childhood and 10 adult) criteria were placed on the list. In addition, 19 of the 22 PCL items were also included; we omitted three that appeared to be too vague and inferential (i.e., psychopath, criminal versatility, and early behavior problems).3
We anticipated potential problems with ordering effects. To minim problem, four random sets of childhood criteria and adult criteria were g Ten copies of the four random sets were prepared in advance of each test given to subjects sequentially to avoid any subtle researcher bias.
All subjects were asked to rate the APD criteria on a 7-point scale wit anchors provided (i.e., 1 = unimportant, 4 = moderately important, and important) to their perceptions of an antisocial personality. They were formed through written instructions that such individuals might also be a "psychopath" or "sociopath" and that mental health professionals them lacked a consensus on the central or core elements of APD. In addition, the directions suggested that subjects might find it helpful in making these ratings to think of a particular person they would consider to have APD. Following the APD ratings, subjects were asked to provide basic background information and were then debriefed.
RESULTS
Prototypicality ratings for childhood characteristics of APD manif siderable variability (overall M = 4.64, SD = .87; range of individua was from 2.96 to 5.98). Seven of the 18 childhood characteristics were (>5) in prototypicality (see Table 1 ).
The 38 adult characteristics of APD evidence somewhat less variabil all M = 4.52, SD = .70; range of individual M ratings was from 3.0
Although the ratings appear less violent than the childhood criteria, t likely an artifact of APD criteria that were studied.
Beyond the prototypicality ratings themselves, we were intereste factors might emerge from the data and their correspondence to exi models. To this end, we conducted a principal components analysis (P combined childhood and adult criteria. First, we performed a para (Holden, Longman, Cota, & Fekken, 1989) , a statistically derived and c tive estimate of the number of factors justified by the data, that su four-factor solution. Second, we performed the PCA for a prespecified solution, rotated to a varimax solution.
Four relatively distinct factors emerged from the APD prototypical which accounted for 46.6% of the variance (see Table 2 ). The first fac of the variance), impaired relationships and deception, comprised 14 lated to the absence of emotions/empathy, lack of responsibility for s and lying/conning. The second factor (12.7% of the variance), aggres ior, consisted of 10 criteria that were characterized by violence, cruelt negligence as a parent. The third factor (10.6% of the variance), nonv linquency, consisted of nine criteria, which are associated with school or neurosis, unreliable, incapacity for love, loss of insight, good intelligence, and motivated antisocial behavior) appear to have no direct parallel in PCL. Although sup nature, we also included these additional seven criteria in our analysis. problems and nonaggressive antisocial acts. The fourth factor (8. ance), frequent sexual relationships not attributable to mental il abuse, is composed of six criteria and characterized by superficia sexual relationships and the absence of alcohol, drugs, or men explanation.
DISCUSSION

Prototypicality Ratings
High prototypicality ratings from childhood represent criminal is unambiguously violent. High ratings focus on aggression toward ual assault, fighting with a weapon, and cruelty), animals, and the property. Nonconformity, by itself, was insufficient to be ranke example, generally low ratings (i.e., <3.50) were found for (a) r intercourse in a casual relationship (M = 2.96, SD = 1.91), (b) poor s (M = 3.45, SD = 1.65), and (c) running way from home (M = 3.5
Only two adult criteria tap unlawful and aggressive behavior, an ranked among the highest (M's of 5.84 and 5.49). We cannot conclu that violence is any less important in public perceptions of adult istics. Four common themes emerge from the nine adult APD cha Table 1 ) rated high in prototypicality: the above-cited antisocial b lack of remorse/empathy, deception, and irresponsibility. 
APD Factors and Diagnostic Systems
The first factor, impaired relationships and deception, focuses al sively on the interpersonal aspects of APD. This factor is remarkably the DSM-III-R (i.e., only 2 of 14 loadings are from DSM-III-R) used cu the diagnosis of APD. Rather, the first factor would appear to offer validity to the PCL, since Factor 1 of the PCL (Hare, Hakstian, Fo Newman, 1990; Harpur, Hare, & Hakstian, 1989) includes similar More specifically, our prototypicality ratings found six criteria from high loadings: callous, lack of empathy, pathological lying, lack of aff lack of sincerity, poor behavioral control, and failure to accept resp With one exception (failure to accept responsibility), these loadings ar on PCL Factor 1 (Harpur et al., 1989) and suggest a moderate cor between the two factors.
The second factor, aggressive behavior, loads heavily on the newly added DSM-III-R childhood criteria; all six of these were included on the second factor (viz., stole from a victim, forced sex, used a weapon in a fight, physical cruelty to people, deliberate firesetting, physical cruelty to animals). In addition, the two adult criteria that are likely to be associated with aggressive behavior (unlawful behavior and physical assaults) also loaded on this factor. Inspection of the second factor in relationship to the 38 adult criteria underscores a pronounced anomaly in DSM-III-R APD diagnosis: The emphasis on violence occurs almost exclusively in the childhood criteria and is conspicuously absent in the adult. We would suspect that if the artifically imposed age restriction (<15) was dropped from the aggressive characteristics, they would assume a more salient role in the definition of APD.
Examination of the third factor, nonviolent delinquency, suggests that a con stellation of nonaggressive delinquent acts may constitute a relevantly distinct component of APD. The clear division in prototypicality ratings between aggre sive and nonaggressive childhood criteria would suggest that this distinction ma be useful in the diagnosis of conduct disorders, if not for APD itself. Interestingl the aggressive and nonaggressive subtypes of conduct disorders were specified in DSM-III (American Psychiatric Association, 1980, pp. 47-50) . In the absence convincing empirical data, we wonder if their virtual deletion4 in DSM-III- (American Psychiatric Association, 1987, p. 56) was not premature.
The fourth and final factor, frequent sexual relationships not attributable t mental illness/substance abuse, combines criteria related to the lack of sustain intimacy with the absence of psychopathological explanations for APD (e.g delusions, irrational thinking, neurosis, drugs, or alcohol). With respect to the exclusion of certain explanations, each diagnostic system has struggled, at leas indirectly, with causal factors of APD. DSM-III excluded individuals whose APD characteristics were "due to" severe mental retardation, schizophrenia, or man episodes (American Psychiatric Association, 1980, p. 321); DSM-III-R ex antisocial behavior that occurred "exclusively during the course of schizop or manic episodes" (American Psychiatric Association, 1987, p. 346) . As no Rogers and Dion (1991) , these exclusion criteria may be less than helpful sin onset of APD is typically in midchildhood, while the emergence of Axis I ders usually occurs much later. The original PCL attempted a similar exclu with substance abuse as "not direct cause of antisocial behavior" (Hare, 199 The obvious problem with this exclusion, at least within correctional sam that APD rarely occurs without substance abuse (see Abram, 1990; C Schlenger, & Jordan, 1988) , and the etiological significance of these coocc disorders remains obscure.
In summary, a review of the four factors in relationship to the diagnostic systems provides several important observations. First, the interpersonal dimensions of APD should not be overlooked. Consistent with current research on the PCL and contrary to DSM-III-R, these dimensions may assume primacy in the conceptualization of APD. Second, aggression and violence appear relevant to APD and should not artificially be limited to youthful behavior (<15 years) as is currently the case with DSM-III-R. Third, nonconformity in childhood as proposed in DSM-III deserves further study, since it is perceived differently from the DSM-III-R emphasis on aggressive behavior. Fourth and finally, questions of etiology that are embedded in the diagnostic criteria (DSM-III, DSM-III-R, and PCL) may confound and confuse our diagnostic thinking about APD.
Rethinking the APD Diagnosis
The prototype approach offers a number of insights for mental disorders (Broughton, 1990; Cantor, Smith, French, & Mezzich, 1980) including the fuzziness of certain diagnoses. Use of prototypic features may clarify a particular diagnosis through the enumeration of core characteristics. In the case of APD, the current polythetic model has deemphasized these core characteristics and resulted in an atheoretical, nonempirical, and nonhierachical list of symptoms. The current prototypical analysis would suggest a rethinking and reorganization of APD. Based on the principal components analysis, APD might be reconceptualized to emphasize impaired relationships and deception, which formed the first factor of this study and is consistent with Factor 1 of the PCL. Both aggressive and nonconforming behavior should be considered separately, a distinction we believe is warranted on the basis of the delinquent literature (see, for example, Hamparian, 1987; Wolfgang & Tracy, 1982) . In the assessment of deviant behavior, the central issue is the standard for judging such behavior. Toward this end, we argue that prototypical analysis of educated public may assist in our understanding of antisocial/prosocial dimensions of APD.
As underscored in the introduction, our current understanding of APD appears to be thoroughly muddled, with endless variations that are treated as if they were equal under the rubric of APD. We would argue that the recent adoption of a polythetic model in 1980 as an attempt to introduce greater flexibility into APD has vastly complicated its diagnosis and vitiated its conceptual underpinnings. We are heartened that the DSM-IV field trials (Hare, Hart, & Harpur, 1991) are testing four alternative sets of criteria, two of which (dyssocial pe disorder and psychopathic personality disorder) prominently include it ciated with impaired relationships and deception. We worry, however, continued emphasis on a single APD disorder. Instead, we would ad investigation of APD subtypes, if not separate-but-related disorders, b convergence of factors from (a) prototypic methods and (b) field trial d APD and non-APD subjects.
